McRitchie Studio

BLOCK (security, verified reachable leak): the redactor leaks the JSON "KEY":"VALUE" secret shape that BOTH the doc and the code comment claim it masks. input/output are JSON.generate-serialized by serialize() BEFORE redact_secrets runs, so any structured tool I/O (MCP tools, nested tool_response hashes) with a secret-named key serializes to "KEY":"VALUE" — the exact form SECRET_ASSIGNMENT misses: its key class [A-Za-z0-9_.\-]* excludes the double-quote, so the key's CLOSING quote sits between the key and the [:=] separator and the match fails. Empirically verified with the exact regex from the diff: {"access_token":"S"}, {"api_key":"S"}, {"AGENT_API_SECRET":"S"}, and nested {"result":{"auth_token":"S"}} ALL pass through UNREDACTED, while shell KEY=VALUE and KEY="VALUE" redact correctly. Reachable: such a tool is neither a Bash secret-reader nor a Read/Write of a secret file, so whole-field suppression never fires either, and the value lands on the PUBLIC /alex/heartbeat surface. THREE fixes required: (1) widen SECRET_ASSIGNMENT so the key->separator tolerates a closing quote (e.g. group 2 = (['"]?\s*[:=]\s*)) and reproduce that group in the gsub replacement; (2) correct docs/agents/system/atomic-capture-hook.md AND the SECRET_ASSIGNMENT code comment — either make "KEY":"VALUE" actually work (preferred) or stop claiming it, and add a one-line 'best-effort; bare/space-separated values with no recognized format (echo $SECRET, --password <val>, cut -d= .env) are not caught' caveat so the 'never ship a secret off the box' headline is honest; (3) add a unit case for the JSON quoted-key shape (current KEY=VALUE test is shell-form only). Non-blocking follow-ups worth a separate task: Solana keypair *.json reads (byte-array, no key) and DATABASE_URL embedded creds are uncaught bare-value gaps. Everything else checks out: redact-before-truncate ordering correct, outcome field carries only ok/error, whole-field suppression + standalone credential formats work and are well tested.

Resolved QA block: JSON "KEY":"VALUE" leak fixed (widened SECRET_ASSIGNMENT + nested-hash regression test), doc corrected with best-effort caveat. Re-certified green.

BLOCK — stale certification (code itself is approved by both reviewers). The redaction logic is sound: whole-field suppression for secret-reader commands (bin/secret, op read, printenv, gh auth token, heroku config, cat/head of .env/credentials/*.pem/*.key) and secret-file Read/Write, plus KEY=VALUE / YAML / JSON "KEY":"VALUE" masking and credential formats (PEM, sk_live/test, AKIA, ghp_/github_pat, xox, Bearer), fail-closed to REDACTED_FIELD on error, redact-BEFORE-truncate. serialize uses JSON.generate so structured/MCP secrets are caught. Regression-first bug SOP satisfied (integration test asserts secret never hits the POST body + 6 unit cases incl. no-false-positive). Doc update honestly scopes the residual bare-value gaps. NO CODE CHANGES NEEDED. The ONLY blocker: the recorded full-suite/rubocop cert is STALE. Cert fingerprint SHA is 722c19cee701370e180bd9f9e49da458c57dd215 but PR head is 9b98b37eee24 — and the head commit ('Redact JSON "KEY":"VALUE" secrets from structured tool I/O') is the security-critical redaction code, which landed AFTER the cert was recorded, so the cert covers older code that lacked the JSON-secret path. bin/dor-check confirms: full-suite STALE + rubocop STALE, refuses submitted->reviewed. REMEDY: from the worktree at head 9b98b37, run 'bin/full-suite-check redact-secrets-from-capture-hook' (full bin/rails test + bin/rubocop, records a fresh fingerprint-bound cert) back-to-back with dor-check in one shot so the fingerprint doesn't drift, confirm green, then move back to submitted. No re-review of logic required on return — just the fresh cert.

Re-certified at current head (722c19cee701) — stale-cert resolved, no code change beyond the approved JSON-secret fix.